immediate knowledge

1) Деловая лексика: сведения из первоисточника

2) Психоанализ: непосредственные знания

непосредственное знание

непосредственные знания

филос. непосредственное знание

{i'mi:diət}
1. непосредствен, непосреден, пряк, най-близък
IMMEDIATE contact/contagion мед. непосредствен допир/заразяване
two objects in IMMEDIATE contact две неща непосредствено едно до друго
IMMEDIATE constituents грам. преки съставни елементи
someone's IMMEDIATE family най-близките родники на някого
2. незабавен, бърз
to take IMMEDIATE action действувам незабавно
house for sale with IMMEDIATE possession продава се къща с влизане веднага
3. пряк, от първа ръка (и за сведения)
IMMEDIATE knowledge фил. интуитивно познание
4. неотложен
work/matter of IMMEDIATE urgency работа/въпрос, който не търпи отлагане

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{i'mi:diъt} а 1. непосредствен, непосреден, пряк, най-близъ

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пряк; неотложен; непосредствен; незабавен;

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immediate[i´mi:diət] adj 1. непосредствен, непосреден, пряк, най-близък; \immediate contact непосредствен допир; o.'s \immediate family най-близките на човека; 2. незабавен, бърз; to take \immediate action действам незабавно; 3. пряк, от първа ръка; \immediate information сведения от първа ръка; 4. неотложен; work of \immediate urgency работа, която не търпи отлагане, неотложна работа.

- immediately

1) прямой, непосредственный; следующий (за чем-л.) непосредственно, без промежуточных стадий

- immediate contagion

2) безотлагательный, незамедлительный; немедленный; неотложный, спешный

3) ближайший

4)

а) недавний, произошедший недавно

б) происходящий здесь и сейчас, текущий

- immediate halt

[ˈnɔlɪdʒ]

actual knowledge фактическое знание обстоятельств дела knowledge знание; познания; эрудиция; to have a good knowledge of English (medicine, etc.) хорошо знать английский язык (медицину и т. п.); branches of knowledge отрасли науки compiled knowledge вчт. скомпилированные знания constructive knowledge конструктивная осведомленность constructive knowledge предполагаемая осведомленность declarative knowledge вчт. декларативные знания descriptive knowledge вчт. дескриптивные знания domain knowledge вчт. предметные знания expert knowledge знания эксперта expert knowledge компетентность expert knowledge вчт. экспертные знания explicit knowledge вчт. явно заданные знания factual knowledge вчт. факты knowledge знание; познания; эрудиция; to have a good knowledge of English (medicine, etc.) хорошо знать английский язык (медицину и т. п.); branches of knowledge отрасли науки having local knowledge обладание местной известностью he did it without my knowledge он сделал это без моего ведома heuristic knowledge вчт. эвристические знания human knowledge вчт. человеческие знания immediate knowledge сведения из первоисточника implicit knowledge вчт. неявные знания intimate knowledge глубокое знание knowledge осведомленность; it came to my knowledge мне стало известно; to (the best of) my knowledge насколько мне известно; not to my knowledge насколько мне известно - нет knowledge знакомство; my knowledge of Mr B is slight я мало знаком с В. knowledge знание knowledge знание; познания; эрудиция; to have a good knowledge of English (medicine, etc.) хорошо знать английский язык (медицину и т. п.); branches of knowledge отрасли науки knowledge вчт. знания knowledge известие; knowledge of the victory soon spread вскоре распространилось известие о победе knowledge осведомленность knowledge осведомленность; it came to my knowledge мне стало известно; to (the best of) my knowledge насколько мне известно; not to my knowledge насколько мне известно - нет knowledge познания knowledge закон.наказ. признание судом фактов, доказанных свидетелями knowledge эрудиция knowledge of case знание дела knowledge of case знание ситуации knowledge of commodities информация о товарах knowledge of law юр. знание закона knowledge of the facts знание фактов knowledge of the first degree знания из первоисточника knowledge of the first degree закон.наказ. сведения из первых рук knowledge of the second degree закон.наказ. опосредованные знания knowledge of the second degree закон.наказ. показания с чужих слов knowledge of the third degree закон.наказ. вероятные знания knowledge of the third degree закон.наказ. предположительные знания knowledge of the third degree закон.наказ. сомнительные знания knowledge известие; knowledge of the victory soon spread вскоре распространилось известие о победе legal knowledge правовые знания knowledge осведомленность; it came to my knowledge мне стало известно; to (the best of) my knowledge насколько мне известно; not to my knowledge насколько мне известно - нет knowledge знакомство; my knowledge of Mr B is slight я мало знаком с В. knowledge осведомленность; it came to my knowledge мне стало известно; to (the best of) my knowledge насколько мне известно; not to my knowledge насколько мне известно - нет open knowledge base вчт. открытая база знаний pragmatic knowledge вчт. прагматические знания preformed knowledge вчт. заранее сформированные знания problem area knowledge знания о предметной области procedure knowledge вчт. процедурные знания product knowledge данные о продукции professional knowledge профессиональные знания semantic knowledge вчт. семантические знания thorough knowledge основательные знания trade knowledge отраслевые знания

   1) To Exist Is to Be Perceived

   It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)

   2) Abstract Science or Demonstration Is a More Perfect Species of Knowledge

   It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.

   But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)

   3) Knowledge Derives from Two Fundamental Sources of the Mind

   Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).

   Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])

   4) The Means by Which Metaphysics Can Be Perfected as a Science

   Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....

   This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)

   5) Knowledge Is Only Real in the Form of System

   Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)

   6) Knowledge, Action, and Evaluation Are Interconnected

   Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)

   7) The Evolution of Knowledge

   "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.

   Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

1) unmittelbar; (nearest) nächst... [Nachbar[schaft], Umgebung, Zukunft]; engst... [Familie]; unmittelbar [Kontakt]

2) (occurring at once) prompt; unverzüglich [Handeln, Maßnahmen]; umgehend [Antwort]

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1) (happening at once and without delay: an immediate response.) unverzüglich

2) (without anyone etc coming between: His immediate successor was Bill Jones.) direkt

3) (close: our immediate surroundings.) unmittelbar

•

- academic.ru/36911/immediately">immediately

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1. (without delay) umgehend, sofortig attr, prompt

to take \immediate action/effect augenblicklich handeln/wirken

\immediate consequences unmittelbare Konsequenzen

2. attr (close) unmittelbar

in the \immediate area/vicinity in der unmittelbaren Umgebung/Nachbarschaft

sb's \immediate boss/superior jds unmittelbarer [o direkter] Chef/Vorgesetzter

sb's \immediate family jds nächste Angehörige

sb's \immediate friends jds engste Freunde

in \immediate future in nächster Zukunft

3. (direct) direkt

\immediate cause unmittelbarer Grund

an \immediate result ein sofortiges Ergebnis

4. (current) augenblicklich, unmittelbar

\immediate concerns/problems/needs dringende Anliegen/Probleme/Bedürfnisse

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1) knowledge, future, object, danger, threat, need, neighbour unmittelbar; vicinity, neighbourhood unmittelbar, nächste(r, s); cause, impact, successor direkt, unmittelbar

2) (= instant) reply, reaction sofortig, umgehend, prompt; thought, conclusion unmittelbar; access direkt

3) (= most urgent) problem, concern dringendste(r, s)

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immediate [ıˈmiːdjət; -dıət; Br auch -dʒət] adj

1. unmittelbar:

a) nächst(gelegen):

in the immediate vicinity in unmittelbarer Nähe, in der nächsten Umgebung;

immediate constituent LING (größeres) Satzglied, Wortgruppe f

b) direkt:

immediate contact unmittelbare Berührung;

immediate cause unmittelbare Ursache;

immediate information Informationen pl aus erster Hand

2. (zeitlich) unmittelbar (bevorstehend), nächst(er, e, es):

in the immediate future in nächster Zukunft

3. unverzüglich, sofortig, umgehend (Antwort etc):

take immediate action sofort handeln;

immediate annuity sofort fällige Rente;

immediate matter JUR Sofortsache f;

immediate objective MIL Nahziel n;

immediate steps Sofortmaßnahmen

4. derzeitig, augenblicklich:

5. nächst(er, e, es) (in der Verwandtschaftslinie):

my immediate family meine nächsten Angehörigen pl

6. PHIL intuitiv, direkt, unmittelbar

7. direkt betreffend, unmittelbar berührend

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1) unmittelbar; (nearest) nächst... [Nachbar[schaft], Umgebung, Zukunft]; engst... [Familie]; unmittelbar [Kontakt]

2) (occurring at once) prompt; unverzüglich [Handeln, Maßnahmen]; umgehend [Antwort]

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direkt adj.

sofort adj.

unmittelbar adj.

unverzüglich adj. n.

sofortig adj.

    Direct and Immediate Knowledge

    Intuition Direct and immediate knowledge, or the immediate apprehension by the self of itself, of the truth of certain propositions, of the external world, and of values, without the prior need for the ability to define a term, to justify a conclusion, or to build upon inferences. (Stumpf, 1994, p. 937)

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

   1) A Unitary Search Process for All the Phenomena of Memory

   To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)

   2) Semantic Memory Is a Mental Thesaurus

   [Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)

   3) The Development of Mnemonic Codes

   The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)

   4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of Psychology

   If a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)

   5) The Constituent Elements of Memory Theory

   We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)

   6) The Problem with the Memory Metaphor

   The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)

   7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat Discouraging

   The results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)

   8) The Structure and Function of a Schema in Memory

   A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)

   9) Competence and Performance in Theories of Memory

   Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....

   Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)

    10) Metaphors of Memory

   When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....

   However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)

    11) Comparison of Primary Memory and Secondary Memory

   Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)

    12) Semantic Memory and Episodic Memory

   Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)

    13) The Relation of Memory to Thinking

   The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)

1. 1) дерево

2) (тж. Tree) рождественское дерево, ёлка

2. родословное дерево, родословная (тж. family tree, genealogical tree, tree of consanguinity)

3. древо

4. 1) что-л. напоминающее дерево

2) сеть (кровеносных сосудов и т. п.)

3) (тж. Tree) арх. распятие

4) виселица (тж. Tyburn tree)

5) спец. дерево, древовидная схема

5. колодка ( сапожная)

6. стр. стойка, подпорка

7. тех. вал; ось

1. 1) загнать на дерево

2) ставить в затруднительное положение, ставить в тупик

2. взбираться на дерево

3. растягивать, расправлять на колодке (обувь и т. п.)

4. снабжать деревянной частью

5. уст. вырастать, превращаться в дерево

1. n

1) дерево

2) родовід (тж family tree, genealogical tree)

3) шибениця (тж Tyburn tree)

4) копил (шевський)

5) буд. стояк, підпірка

6) тех. вал; вісь

2. v

1) загнати на дерево

2) вилізти на дерево

3) ставити у скрутне становище

4) розтягувати, вирівнювати на копилі (взуття)

5) виростати, перетворюватися на дерево

* * *

1) дерево

2) родовідне дерево, родовід (family tree, genealogical tree, tree of consanguinity)

3) древо

4) що-н. дерево, що нагадує

5) колодка ( черевичн)

6) стр. стійка, підпора

7) тex. вал; вісь

••

1) загнати на дерево

2) підійматися на дерево

3) розтягувати, розпрямляти на колодці ( взуття)

4) забезпечувати дерев'яною частиною

5) icт. зростати, перетворюватися на дерево

1) дерево

2) родовідне дерево, родовід (family tree, genealogical tree, tree of consanguinity)

3) древо

4) що-н. дерево, що нагадує

5) колодка ( черевичн)

6) стр. стійка, підпора

7) тex. вал; вісь

••

1) загнати на дерево

2) підійматися на дерево

3) розтягувати, розпрямляти на колодці ( взуття)

4) забезпечувати дерев'яною частиною

5) icт. зростати, перетворюватися на дерево